



**HISTORY
HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL
PAPER 1**

Thursday 4 November 2004 (afternoon)

1 hour

QUESTION BOOKLET - INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
- Refer to the Source Booklet which accompanies this examination paper.
- Answer all the questions in one section only. Either:
 - Section A
 - or
 - Section B
 - or
 - Section C.

SECTION C

Prescribed Subject 3 The Cold War, 1960 to 1979

These questions relate to Nixon's foreign policy of détente. The accompanying sources are on pages 8 to 10 in the Source Booklet.

9. (a) According to Source A, what were Nixon's objectives for his foreign policy? [3 marks]
- (b) What political message is portrayed in Source C? [2 marks]
10. In what ways are the views expressed in Source B supported by Sources C and D? [6 marks]
11. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Source A and Source E for historians studying the period of détente. [6 marks]
12. Using these sources and your own knowledge, explain what considerations prompted the United States, China, and the Soviet Union, to improve their relations. [8 marks]
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SOURCE BOOKLET

SOURCE BOOKLET – INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Do not open this booklet until instructed to do so.
- This booklet contains all of the sources required for Paper 1.
 - Section A page 2
 - Section B page 5
 - Section C page 8

Sources in this booklet have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets []; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses in square brackets [...]; minor changes are not indicated.

SECTION C

Prescribed Subject 3 The Cold War, 1960 to 1979

These sources relate to Nixon's foreign policy of détente.

SOURCE A *Extract from Richard Nixon, First Inaugural Address, 20 January, 1969.*

The greatest honor history can bestow is the title of peacemaker [...] Let all nations know that during this administration our lines of communication will be open. We seek an open world – open to ideas, open to the exchange of goods and people – a world in which no people, great or small, will live in angry isolation. We cannot expect to make everyone our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy. Those who would be our adversaries, we invite to a peaceful competition – not in conquering territory or extending power, but in enriching the life of man. As we explore the reaches of space, let us go to the new worlds together – not as new worlds to be conquered, but as a new adventure to be shared. With those who are willing to join, let us cooperate to reduce the burden of arms, to strengthen the structure of peace, to lift up the poor and the hungry.

SOURCE B *Extract from Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938 by Stephen Ambrose and Douglas G Brinkley; Eighth Revised Edition, New York, 1997.*

It all came down to the program Nixon called Vietnamization. Six months after taking office, he announced that his secret plan to end the war was in fact a plan to keep it going, but with lower American casualties. He proposed to withdraw American combat troops, unit by unit, while continuing to give air and naval support to ARVN [Army of South Vietnam] and rearming ARVN with the best military hardware America had to offer [...] Nixon had high hopes for his policy when he started out [...] Dr Henry Kissinger had convinced him that there was a path to peace with honor in Vietnam and it led through Moscow and Peking. If the two communist superpowers would only refrain from supplying arms to the North Vietnamese, Kissinger argued, Hanoi would have to agree to a compromise peace, a policy he called “linkage”. The United States would withhold favors and agreements from the Russians until they cut off the arms flow to Hanoi [...] Linkage assumed that world politics revolved around the constant struggle for supremacy between the great powers [...] Kissinger regarded North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos as pawns to be moved around the board of the great powers. He insisted on viewing the war as a highly complex game in which the moves were made from Washington, Moscow and Peking.

SOURCE C

American Cartoon, 1972 by Nancy King and editors published in A Cartoon History of United States Foreign Policy, New York, 1991. The three nations are represented by Mao, Brezhnev and Nixon.



Nixon "I'm not sure of the rules, but it looks like an interesting game."

SOURCE D

Extracts from the Joint Communiqué between the People's Republic of China and the United States of America issued in Shanghai, 28 February, 1972.

The two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude [secretly plot] with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

SOURCE E

Extract from "The White House Years" by Henry Kissinger, Boston, 1979.

With the SALT announcement on 20 May, we seized the initiative. It was followed [...] by the announcement of the Moscow summit, and a nearly uninterrupted series of unexpected moves that captured the "peace issues" and kept our opponents off balance [...] Whatever one's views about détente in the abstract, in the context of 1971 and 1972 the carefully considered measures of the Administration toward the Soviet Union were imperative to prevent a long rush toward abdication of responsibility in America and among our allies. Our willingness to discuss détente had lured Brezhnev into an initiative about mutual force reductions that saved our whole European defense structure [...] It was a classical example of why such a policy was needed to maintain the essential elements of national security if we were to avoid the destruction of our national defense and Alliance solidarity in the era of Vietnam.
